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Abstract
The prevailing view about our memory skills is that they serve a complex epistemic function. I shall call 
this the “monistic view.” Instead of a monistic, exclusively epistemic approach, I propose a transactional 
view. On this approach, autobiographical memory is irreducible to the epistemic functions of episodic 
memory because of its essentially moral and empathic character. I argue that this transactional view pro-
vides a more plausible and integral account of memory capacities in humans, based on theoretical and 
empirical reasons. Memory, on this account, plays two distinctive roles. The episodic memory system 
satisfies epistemic needs and is valuable because it is a source of justification for beliefs about the past. 
Autobiographical memory satisfies moral and narrative-autonoetic needs, and is valuable because it is 
a source of personally meaningful and insightful experiences about our past. Unlike autobiographical 
memory, episodic memory is only weakly autonoetic. The relation between these two roles of memory is 
captured by the tension between a narrative and an accurate report.
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1. Introduction
Nelson Goodman described a tension between the cognitive functions of reporting 
and narrating.1 The cognitive function of reporting is best understood as epistemic. 
Its purpose is to provide reliable information about events. A report, if accurate, can 
be used as evidence. The cognitive function of narrating a story is different. Its main 
purpose is not necessarily to provide accurate information, but rather to make events 
cohere in an insightful manner. “Insightful” here is best understood in terms of moral 
or aesthetic relevance. The narrative must rank events in an order of importance that 
is not epistemic—a ranking of events from the most valuable and consequential to the 
more peripheral—independently of their being accurate or fictitious. Memories of an 
event (e.g., the taste of a madeleine dipped in tea, or the drowsy experience produced by 
intense sunlight as one stands on a beach) may vary in degrees of accuracy but preserve 
the event’s value and significance. Generally, the truth of a description concerning an 
event, even if satisfies the highest epistemic standards, is not relevant to its narrative 
significance. What truly matters for narrative value are the essential insights one can 
draw from the event.
Frequently, by turning a narrative into a mere report we lose its insightfulness. Likewise, 
by turning a report into an interesting narrative we lose some of its accuracy and strictly 
epistemic value. Although Goodman did not apply this analysis to memory, I argue that 
this tension between reporting and narrating is crucial for understanding how human 
memory capacities work. This is a natural extension of Goodman’s distinction. Reports 
and narratives are the subject matter of history, and it is a notorious difficulty to inter-
pret the narrative relevance of accurate documents or even of entire archives. The task 
of the historian can be understood in terms of the creation of collective memories that 
identify critical events as the most momentous and valuable ones, thereby establishing 
a ranking of all accurate events. This ranking of events must emphasize why something 
that occurred—and which was witnessed by reliable historical figures—matters for the 
integration of a larger narrative that humans should care about. Presumably, the origin 
of the two distinctive cognitive functions of reporting and narrating is the way in which 
human memory works. An analysis of this distinction in the context of human memory, 
I propose, yields important new insights that can help explain findings in psychology. 
This distinction, I shall argue, also has broader implications for the nature of conscious 
experience.
1  Nelson Goodman, “Twisted Tales; or, Story, Study, and Symphony,” In On Narrative, ed. W. J. T. Michell 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 99–115.
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One view of the content of a narrative is that all of its cognitive aspects ultimately de-
pend upon the degree of accuracy of the events it describes. This reductive view, which 
collapses the narrative elements into descriptive ones, is implausible in general. For in-
stance, the moral insights of fictional tales are extremely powerful, and a substantial part 
of their potency lies largely in being independent from the contingencies of concrete 
facts. Cultures around the world teach about their moral values through this type of 
fictional narrative, even though the events described in the stories are intentionally al-
legorical. Similar considerations apply to literature. The tension between description and 
narration finds interesting limit points in genres such as biographies, autobiographies, 
and journalism. If one considers aesthetic value, instead of moral value, the reductive 
view is even more implausible. The aesthetic value of a painting (e.g., a landscape or a 
portrait) in no way depends on the accuracy of the depiction. If we want to analyze the 
moral and aesthetic dimensions of narrative, we must adopt a nonreductive view, ac-
cording to which narrative value is not reducible to descriptive accuracy. Although giv-
ing a full account of moral and aesthetic value is a complex matter that I cannot pursue 
here in detail, it suffices for our purposes to understand Goodman’s distinction in terms 
of the irreducibility of the ranking of events or experiences, in terms of their narrative 
value, to their accuracy.
With respect to memory, however, the reductive approach is quite plausible and, in fact, 
it is the prevailing view. The reductive approach correlates with the view of memory that 
I shall call “monistic,” and the nonreductive view corresponds to the transactional view 
defended in this paper. The monistic view states that memory is “personal” by virtue of 
the reliable information provided by episodic memory about events in our past, which 
we use to reliably plan for the future. On this view, episodic memory is what allows us to 
have autobiographical narratives. The alternative view I defend here, the “transactional 
view,” proposes the irreducibility of a personal narrative to mere informational access and 
accuracy. It is “transactional” because the epistemic and narrative functions of memory 
constantly interact with each other in order to balance accuracy and narrative trade-offs. 
Briefly stated, the challenge presented here against the monistic view is that accuracy is 
insufficient for narrative relevance, although accuracy might be necessary in many cases. 
Although this is not an entirely uncontroversial way of parsing the functions of memory, 
I shall argue that it is justified by Goodman’s important distinction.
A distinct difficulty in the case of memory, which goes beyond the tension between nar-
rative value and descriptive accuracy, is that autobiographical memories are deeply per-
sonal; their value is unique to an individual at a time. This aspect of autobiographical 
memory cannot be reduced to the accuracy of events stored in episodic memory either. 
On the one hand, our memories are related to our personal identity, and may even con-
stitute who we are, according to the psychological continuity view. On the other hand, 
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memory is a fundamental epistemic capacity that reliably provides information that we 
acquired in the past in order to inform perception, action, decision making, as well as 
successful communication with others. Based on this accurate information, we can be 
relied upon as witnesses of past events. Although the tension between essentially in-
dexical information and publicly shared reliable information is not the main topic of this 
paper, I provide reasons in support of the view that without a transactional approach, 
we cannot explain the personal and unique value of autobiographical memory. More 
precisely, the arguments below provide reasons in support of the view that the non–epis-
temically reducible information provided by autobiographical memory is a necessary 
condition for the essentially indexical character of memory.
Despite the complexities of the topics of introspection and indexical content, the main 
point is that the transactional view can account for the uniquely personal way in which 
memories are ranked in terms of value, without reducing their value to epistemic and intro-
spective attitudes and judgments about the contents of memory. The unique perspective of 
a subject can be understood in terms of the experienced intensity and meaningfulness of 
his or her experiences, as experienced by the subject, rather than as epistemically assessed 
by the subject through belief or judgment. These value rankings in terms of intensity and 
meaningfulness would, on this account, constitute the subjective perspective of an indi-
vidual’s memories, not because of epistemic attitudes toward contents, but because amal-
gamating memories in terms of value is the proper function of a distinct type of memory: 
autobiographical memory. As explained below, significant problems emerge if autobio-
graphical memory is construed in terms of mere introspective judgments and epistemic 
attitudes. A way of avoiding these problems is to explain autobiographical memory in its 
own terms, as a phenomenally conscious type of memory that provides personal value. 
Thus, the question this paper addresses can be stated as follows. Can autobiographi-
cal memory (i.e., remembering what happened as determined by my self-narrative) be 
reduced to episodic memory (i.e., the capacity for accurately remembering events and 
their chronology as framed by my temporal perspective)? This paper defends two claims. 
The first is that there is a fundamental tension between the narrative and epistemic roles 
of memory, analogous to the tension between reports and narratives. Autobiographi-
cal memory is not reducible to episodic memory. The memory system must somehow 
achieve an optimal balance between epistemic and narrative trade-offs, or between accu-
racy and personal value. The second claim is that the distinction between phenomenally 
conscious and other types of implicit memory helps clarify how memory achieves this 
balance. Autobiographical memory tracks a conscious person’s valuable phenomenal ex-
periences, not a series of accurate recollections.2 
2  See also Carlos Montemayor and Harry Haroutioun Haladjian, Consciousness, Attention, and Conscious 
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These are the central claims of the transactional view. This view entails that episodic 
memory, which some authors describe as narrative and essentially autonoetic, is insuf-
ficient to explain the vividness and personal relevance of autobiographical memories. 
I argue that autobiographical memory plays the unique role of narrative-engagement. 
More specifically, the second thesis states that episodic memory is insufficient to account 
for the phenomenology of autobiographical memory. Crucially, the transactional view 
explains why autobiographical memory has a proper function to perform within the 
memory system. Episodic memory has its own, strictly epistemic functions. Autobio-
graphical memory, by contrast, has a narrative and moral function (and perhaps even an 
aesthetic one), rather than a strictly epistemic function. A narrative is not valuable sim-
ply in virtue of being a narrative. A narrative, however, provides the necessary structure 
for value assignments that create personal value, and this structure is incompatible with 
the purely accurate temporal structure of episodic memory.
2. The epistemic roles of memory
The monistic view is based on an epistemic approach to memory. It is the most popular 
view of memory (as documented below), and it is also extremely intuitive. Its plausibility 
comes from many sources, but I shall focus on a particular powerful consideration: an 
analogy between memory and perception. Analogously to perceptual capacities, mem-
ory requires accuracy conditions. For memory to constitute knowledge, memories need 
to accurately represent causal relations, temporal information, and semantic contents.3 
Information acquired in the past needs to be reliable in order for it to serve as the eviden-
tial basis for beliefs about future regularities, plans, and expectations. Memory affords 
knowledge about information learned in the past that can be used to envision the future, 
and it provides the basis for counterfactual reasoning and long-term planning.4 
Like “perceiving,” “remembering” seems to be a success term—by perceiving, one suc-
cessfully becomes acquainted with features of the environment, and by remembering 
one successfully gains access to the past. Perceptual illusions are a type of partial failure, 
as are forms of confabulation. The worst type of perceptual failure, hallucination, cor-
relates with a disturbing epistemic failure: a fully confabulated memory. Perception and 
memory are key, and analogous, epistemic capacities. Any successful epistemic agent 
Attention (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015) for the larger implications of the distinction between 
phenomenal consciousness and several forms of attention.
3  John Campbell, Past, Space, and Self (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).
4  Felipe De Brigard, “Is Memory for Remembering? Recollection as a Form of Episodic Hypothetical 
Thinking,” Synthese 191, no. 2 (2014): 1–31.
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needs the mutual cooperation of perceptual and mnemonic skills in order to navigate 
the world.5 
In addition, memory is not just a discrete section of the “body of knowledge” a person 
has at a moment in time. Rather, it is a capacity, a competence, with proper functions, 
which are described in more detail below. Like perception, memory is fundamentally 
the exercise of memory skills. This point deserves emphasis. At storage and retrieval, 
memories about a specific event must be unified and archived as memories about the 
same episode, analogously to the binding problem in perception in which various fea-
tures must be unified into a single object. The integration of information in memory and 
perception must also comply with requirements for knowledge, in the sense that they 
should provide safe, nonaccidental, and justified true beliefs that serve as guides toward 
successful action. 
These are substantial advantages of the monistic view. Its main limitation, however, is 
that it cannot explain important aspects of conscious memory, in particular, the phe-
nomenology of autobiographical memory. This seems to be an asymmetry between per-
ception and memory. Conscious autobiographical memory is unlike conscious percep-
tion in fundamental respects, because its proper function is narrative, rather than strictly 
epistemic. Autobiographical memory does not integrate information in order to accu-
rately represent events. It integrates events in order to construct a meaningful personal 
narrative. How can this be reconciled with the need for accuracy? The transactional ap-
proach proposes a specific trade-off to solve this problem. This trade-off requires a dis-
tinction between phenomenally conscious memory and other forms of not necessarily 
conscious memory. In fact, the distinction can be made in terms of phenomenal and 
access memory (semantic and episodic), as explained below.
Before presenting the transactional view, the monistic view must be explained in more 
detail. Johannes Mahr and Gergely Csibra’s characterization of episodic memory is one 
of the most comprehensive accounts of the monistic view.6 According to them, an im-
5  It is important to clarify that this “success term” view is not as popular in psychology. Future planning, 
in particular, need not require completely accurate memories (this is related to some issues associated 
with the trade-offs discussed below). In fact, it has been proposed that not having perfectly accurate 
memories is adaptive and advantageous (see Daniel L. Schacter, Mieke Verfaille, and Dan Pradere, “The 
Neuropsychology of Memory Illusions: False Recall and Recognition in Amnesic Patients,” Journal of 
Memory and Language 35, no. 2 [2011]: 319–34).
6  See Johannes B. Mahr and Gergely Csibra, “Why Do We Remember? The Communicative Function 
of Episodic Memory,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41 (2017): 1–93, doi: 10.1017/S0140525X17000012. 
Mahr and Csibra’s account of “autonoesis” comes very close to the kind of narrative role I attribute to 
autobiographical memory, which places their view closer to the transactional view than to the standard 
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portant aspect of episodic memory is that it is autonoetic, in the sense that by remem-
bering what happened in a temporally structured way, one reliably gains access to how 
events occurred in relation to ourselves, from our unique first-person perspective, which 
is a source of self-knowledge. But as they emphasize in their paper, this typical way of 
characterizing episodic memory captures only one part of what makes episodic memory 
epistemically fundamental. Episodic memory, they argue, should not only be understood 
in terms of autonoesis but, fundamentally, as a specific attitude toward the simulation 
of an event. According to Mahr and Csibra, episodic memory is a source of psychologi-
cal and communicative justification that serves as the basis for introspective judgments. 
Still, the propositional attitude toward the contents of episodic memory involved in 
these judgments seems epistemic (even assertive) in the sense that communication has 
accuracy conditions and must be reliable. This constraint accords with the perception-
analogy that motivates the monistic view, and seems at odds with the transactional ac-
count. Although the expansion of episodic memory into realms of self-knowledge that 
involves social communication is an attractive feature of Mahr and Csibra’s account, it 
might not be sufficient to account for the phenomenology of autobiographical memory, 
which is strongly autonoetic in the sense that memories appear to have a given value 
independently of introspective judgments about their contents, of the form “I witnessed 
this.” 
The view that autobiographical memory is determined by the contents of episodic mem-
ory is endorsed by Mahr and Csibra. However, they acknowledge that autobiographical 
memory and episodic memory may not be the same thing. A key issue here is how to 
understand the propositional attitude toward those contents. Although they do not talk 
about autobiographical memory in detail, they say that episodic memory is autonoetic 
in the sense that events are witnessed or experienced first-hand. This grounds a type 
of co-witnessing that facilitates communication. But the expression “I witnessed this 
firsthand” is an introspective judgment, and as such, the propositional attitude involved 
is epistemic: it is a belief that is immediately justified. Although the communicative 
character of co-witnessing is not an exclusively epistemic capacity reducible to accuracy 
conditions because it involves interactions with others, it is epistemic in the sense that 
it provides the basis for self-knowledge introspections, and these introspections need 
monistic view. I categorize their view as monistic because the trade-off I emphasize here does not play 
a critical role in their analysis. More importantly, there is a key distinction between the two approaches: 
the transactional approach avoids the problem of introspective judgments about memory contents and 
epistemic attitudes toward them, which is a condition for autonoesis in Mahr and Csibra. For this reason, 
their account of autonoesis does not seem to provide the right analysis of the phenomenology of conscious 
memory, for reasons explained in sections 2 and 3. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for 
pointing out to me the similarities between these two approaches.
Volume19, Issue 2Essays in Philosophy
8 | eP1612 Essays in Philosophy
not exhaust the attitudes and phenomenology of autobiographical memory value-judg-
ments. In fact, it is a consequence of their account that autonoesis is also a capacity to 
assert epistemic authority concerning the past. Social obligations and successful com-
munication rely at least partly on this capacity.7 These are the essentially epistemic roles 
of episodic memory, and they are best understood in monistic rather than transactional 
terms. 
One feature of episodic memory I shall focus on now is the interaction between the 
storage and retrieval of memories, in particular the way memories might be recontextu-
alized during retrieval. My goal is to show that a “trade-offs” approach to the epistemic 
functions of memory can help illuminate the interaction between episodic and autobio-
graphical memory. The trade-offs approach accurately captures essential aspects of the 
epistemic roles of memory, and it is crucial for the transactional view.8 
The trade-offs of episodic memory are epistemic in the sense that a balance needs to 
be achieved between two epistemically problematic but cognitively powerful tenden-
cies. There is, for instance, a trade-off between the rigidly itemized storage and retrieval 
of event-traces (e.g., memories that are stored in a way that no future information can 
change their content) and their flexibly structured recontextualization at retrieval (e.g., 
based on their emotional and social aspects). This is an architectural trade-off. If memo-
ry worked the way a von Neumann computer works, memories would be rigidly stored 
and would require vast amounts of storage space. Retrieval could not change the infor-
mation stored, and information could not be contextualized because the instructions for 
retrieval would be rigidly related to stored memories. Here there is a risk of epistemic 
inflexibility.
The opposite tendency, however, generates the epistemic risk of unreliability and con-
fabulation. If memories can be modified and updated extensively at retrieval, there could 
be loss of reliable information that a rigid system would preserve. A completely flexible 
architecture would need very complex rules for updating memories while preserving the 
information that is fundamental for these memories to be reliable. Episodic memories 
must be stored and retrieved in a way that there is enough flexibility at retrieval without 
7  For an account of the epistemic normativity of social communication, assertion and joint attention, see 
Abrol Fairweather and Carlos Montemayor, Knowledge, Dexterity, and Attention: A Theory of Epistemic 
Agency (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), chapters 5–7.
8  Some of these trade
offs are introduced, although in a very different context, in Carlos Montemayor, “Memory: Epistemic and 
Phenomenal Traces,” in Time and Trace: Multidisciplinary Investigations of Temporality, ed. Simone Gross 
and Steve Ostovich (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 215–31.
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jeopardizing accuracy. This epistemic trade-off is related to the trade-off between accu-
racy and narrative value in the sense that accuracy needs to be balanced with flexibility, 
which may be characterized in terms of contextual-narrative information. The key dif-
ference is that this is an entirely architectural trade-off, which can be formulated inde-
pendently of any considerations about autobiographical narrative.
There is also a trade-off concerning the quality of access to traces, or how detailed they 
are. This is a semantic trade-off. Remembering events in excruciating detail is at one ex-
treme of epistemic accuracy. If we could remember in extreme detail every single aspect 
of the events of one day in our lives, these memories would be distracting us from more 
pressing needs to an extent that we might find unnerving or disorienting. If this kind of 
precision extended to every memory in our lives we would be extremely competent at 
accessing contents, but we would find it hard to judge which memories are more relevant 
than others. One would not only remember an event that one needs to retrieve from 
memory (where was I three months ago?) but also what one was wearing, the exact color 
of our socks, the precise posture we had when we encountered someone, what we had for 
breakfast, at what exact time, etc.
Remembering in the most abstract and ambiguous way is at the opposite extreme of 
mnemonic detail. Instead of remembering every single aspect of an event, the entire day 
would be categorized in a conceptual frame in which no specific details are provided. 
One would remember where one was a month ago and that one had the typical daily 
routine (breakfast, lunch, some meetings, dinner) but no details about specific clothing 
or features of people would be provided. An epistemic agent with the skills to achieve 
a balance between extreme detail and extreme abstractness will be better off than those 
who are at the extremes (although in some contexts, such as memory contests, the one at 
the remarkable-detail extreme might be better off). The brain normally strikes a balance 
between these two extremes.9
A different balance point concerns the suppression and intrusion of memories. Suppres-
sion impedes access to a memory that one is trying to remember. In many cases, it is 
good to suppress memories that would distract us or make our lives more disorienting 
than they already are. But in extreme cases, suppression could come close to crippling 
amnesia. The suppression of memories that must be ignored in order to retrieve only 
those memories that are relevant should not be so pervasive that they make any attempt 
at retrieval a challenge.
9  Rodrigo Quian Quiroga, Borges and Memory: Encounters with the Human Brain, translated by Juan 
Pablo Fernandez (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012).
Volume19, Issue 2Essays in Philosophy
10 | eP1612 Essays in Philosophy
Intrusion, by contrast, affords involuntary access to a memory that one is trying to for-
get. In cases like PTSD, intrusion can lead to epistemic as well as narrative distortions 
and become a constant source of anxiety. If there were too much suppression, memories 
could not be either generated spontaneously or related to contexts. Too much intrusion, 
however, is extremely disrupting. Of these three epistemic trade-offs, this might be the 
most important one for the relation between accuracy and narrative, although as I argue 
below, balancing even this trade-off is insufficient to explain autobiographical memory 
and its phenomenology.
Optimal solutions to these three trade-offs underlie the proper functions of episodic 
memory. In essence, what drives the balancing of these trade-offs is the goal of achieving 
the right degree of epistemic justification and accuracy for thought, decision-making, and 
action. It is in this sense that episodic memory is autonoetic. It provides authoritative, 
first-person access to memories and their contents in a reliable way, including introspec-
tive judgments about contents that lead to the formation of justified beliefs.10 Episodic 
memory is, therefore, the most critical source of temporally structured introspection 
judgments about events in our past in relation to our future plans, which certainly is a 
fundamental kind of self-knowledge. I shall call this the “minimally autonoetic” function 
of memory, because the memory skills involved in episodic memory provide knowledge 
of ourselves in terms of the accurate retrieval of events in our past.
What about the phenomenology of memory? The monistic view has very little to say about 
this issue. This might be a consequence of the epistemic approaches to memory that seek 
to explain its relation to epistemic vigilance, authority, communicability, reliability, and 
overall epistemic functioning. In other words, what matters about memory according 
to monistic accounts is the adequate performance of these critical skills, rather than 
how we experience memories. Implicit memory for motor control, semantic memory 
for the retrieval of conceptual contents, declarative memory for the communication of 
inferences and thoughts about memories are all types of memory that constantly interact 
with episodic memory. Episodic memory is the most epistemically complex form of 
memory, but can its autonoetic aspects explain phenomenally conscious memory? 
Can autobiographical memory just be a memory content, rather than a unique type of 
memory function not reducible to the epistemic roles of episodic memory? 
Monism answers these questions positively, but I shall answer them negatively. I argue 
10  This issue is deeply related to the epistemic authority epistemic agents possess because of their capacities. 
For reasons of space, I cannot delve into this issue here, but see Fairweather and Montemayor, Knowledge, 
Dexterity, and Attention, for a full account of epistemic agency based on a virtue-reliabilist theoretical 
approach.
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that memory provides two types of justification: internal and external. Episodic mem-
ory can indeed be described as an epistemic attitude toward information that serves as 
a source of epistemic justification. It is autonoetic, but only in a weak sense because its 
main function concerns skills for reliable communication and epistemic authority with 
respect to past events, rather than the personal value or narrative insightfulness of some 
memories. Conscious autobiographical memory is strongly autonoetic because it bal-
ances a non-epistemic trade-off concerning the vividness and personal value of memo-
ries. Episodic memory provides an external epistemic justification about a background 
of events we reliably share with others, and which certainly constitute a fundamental 
source of self-knowledge. Conscious autobiographical memory, however, provides an 
internal, moral, or empathic kind of justification that truly matters only to us as in-
dividuals: it determines which are the memories we cherish or fear the most; which 
memories bring us enormous pleasure and which we would rather forget.
3. The insufficiency of weakly autonoetic memory
What I shall call the “narrative challenge” justifies the transactional view of autobio-
graphical memory. This challenge is based on findings that show the limitations of the 
monistic approach, particularly of its weakly autonoetic contents as an explanation of 
the emotional relevance and personal value of memory. After reviewing these findings 
on memory distortions based on narrative effects, I present evidence concerning the 
moral relevance of conscious memory. The transactional approach, unlike the monis-
tic view, can explain these findings as evidence in support of a comprehensive view of 
memory that does not reduce personal value to epistemic justification. 
Humans distort and confabulate constantly, and in a systematic way, depending on 
context, semantic information, and the narrative plausibility of unreal events.11 These 
epistemic infelicities are based on unusual but not implausible inaccuracy, plausibly 
doctored photographs, semantic lures, and imagination inflation.12 These effects are 
epistemically pernicious, but they can all be characterized as narrative influences that 
11  Elizabeth Loftus and colleagues: Elizabeth F. Loftus, “Leading questions and the eyewitness report,” 
Cognitive Psychology 7 (1975): 560–572; Elizabeth F. Loftus and Jacqueline E. Pickrell, “The formation of 
false memories,” Psychiatric Annals 25 (1995): 720–725.
12  See, respectively, Ira E. Hyman, Troy H. Husband, and F. James Billings, “False Memories of Childhood 
Experiences,” Applied Cognitive Psychology 9 (1995): 181–97; Stephen D. Lindsay et al., “True 
Photographs and False Memories,” Psychological Science 15, no. 3 (2004): 149–54; Henry L. Roediger and 
Kathleen B. McDermott, “Creating false memories: Remembering words not presented in lists,” Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 21, no. 4 (1995): 803-814; and Lyn M. Goff 
and Henry L. Roediger, “Imagination Inflation for Action Events: Repeated Imaginings Lead to Illusory 
Recollections,” Memory and Cognition 26, no. 1 (1998): 20–23.
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negatively impact epistemic functioning. Is memory malfunctioning in these cases? Or 
is memory performing one of its proper functions—an autobiographical function that 
ranks the value and importance of experiences in relation to how events occur, even at 
the cost of accuracy?
The traditional theoretical diagnosis of the type of memory distortions and infelicities 
reported in these findings, which is partly based on the analogy with perception 
mentioned above, is that the memory system has indeed misfired and gone badly in 
these cases. Accordingly, any kind of false memories are illusory or fully confabulated, 
and they are only a kind of “seeming to remember.”13 Recent alternative approaches try 
to avoid this skeptical interpretation.14 Although these alternative approaches avoid 
the problem of making narrative effects fully confabulatory, they end up emphasizing 
epistemic aspects of memory, such as counterfactually based prediction, decision-
making, and overall coherence. These epistemic functions of “seeming to remember,” 
however, are weakly autonoetic because they involve attitudes toward contents 
assessed in terms of introspective judgments, which do not fully account for either 
the phenomenology of memory or the value attributed to how we experience certain 
memories.
Mirroring the distinction between weak and strongly autonoetic memory, the notion 
of “coherence” may also have external and internal aspects. What is coherent in an 
overall episode of events that I share and communicate reliably with others (e.g., what 
happened yesterday, who was at the meeting two weeks ago) may be entirely irrelevant 
to what I find valuable or significant about those events. We go together to a concert. 
You and I can remember the events from meeting before the concert to saying good-
bye afterward. We can place the events in a similar, coherent set of times that we could 
both write down as an accurate report of the evening—we can serve as witnesses of 
the events that transpired. But I may remember this evening as one of the most impor-
tant memories in my life while you may forget it soon. Nothing in the accuracy of our 
reports predicts anything about how much value we give to these memories. To me, 
the external justification for beliefs about what happened that evening, which we both 
share, says nothing about the internal justification I have to value these memories as a 
13  Robert Audi, Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (London: 
Routledge, 1998); Sven Bernecker, Memory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
14  See the approaches, for example, of Felipe De Brigard, who emphasizes counterfactual reasoning, 
and Richard D. Lane et al., “Memory Reconsolidation, Emotional Arousal, and the Process of Change 
in Psychotherapy: New Insights from Brain Science,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 38 (2015): e1, doi: 
10.1017/S0140525X14000041, who emphasizes the cognitive processes of memory integration and 
reconsolidation.
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crucial part of my personal narrative.
Evidence shows that healthy patients systematically distort memories, significantly more 
than impaired patients with amnesia.15 These findings suggest that memory distortions 
are likely beneficial. But how could this be, if the monistic view is true? This is the em-
pirical version of the narrative challenge: the scientific evidence suggest that memory 
distortions are pervasive and contextually based, and that healthy patients distort more 
than impaired patients. But how can this be the case if distortion is analogous to illusion 
and hallucination?
There is also a theoretical version of the narrative challenge, which is based on Good-
man’s distinction between reports and stories: in principle, the accuracy of some events 
tells me nothing about what I may find personally significant about them. Memories can 
be personally significant in at least two ways, moral and aesthetic. A kind of moral and 
aesthetic coherence must be vital for strongly autonoetic autobiographical memory; it is 
a kind of coherence that affects us on a personal level. Otherwise, we would experience 
our lives as if they were reports we can share with others. The empirical and theoretical 
versions of the narrative challenge to the monistic view support an alternative view—the 
transactional approach.
Instead of a monistic, epistemic approach, I propose an irreducibly narrative approach to 
conscious autobiographical memory, based on internal rather than external autonoetic 
justification. On this approach, autobiographical memory is irreducible to the epistemic 
functions of episodic memory. The external accuracy conditions concerning past events 
provide the basis for epistemic authority in our attitudes toward simulations of the past, 
which in turn justify beliefs about such events, including introspective beliefs. As men-
tioned, this is indeed a critical epistemic function of episodic memory. But there is an 
internal function that memory must have in order for it to make memories personally 
vivid, insightful, and valuable, or strongly autonoetic (i.e., strongly self-relevant, rather 
than merely based on epistemic authority with respect to knowledge of past events). It 
is this strongly autonoetic function of memory that provides moral and aesthetic, rather 
than merely epistemic, value to memories.
There is evidence suggesting that epistemic and moral responses to the same stimulus 
can be dissociated in terms of internal (or empathic) and external information.16 A criti-
15  Daniel L. Schacter, Mieke Verfaille, and Dan Pradere. “The Neuropsychology of Memory Illusions: False 
Recall and Recognition in Amnesic Patients, Journal of Memory and Language 35, no. 2 (1996): 319–34.
16  Yoni K. Ashar et al., “Empathic Care and Distress: Predictive Brain Markers and Dissociable Brain 
Systems,” Neuron 94, no. 6: 1263–73; Carlos Montemayor and Harry Haroutioun Haladjian, Consciousness, 
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cal piece of evidence in favor of the strongly autonoetic function of memory shows that 
judgments about the self, based on autobiographical memory, are determined by moral 
significance.17 This function does not necessarily depend on epistemic aspects of mem-
ory, and it may include basic forms of empathy that do not depend on epistemic func-
tions concerning mind reading.18 The weakly autonoetic expressions “this happened to 
me” or “I witnessed this firsthand” need to be asserted with epistemic authority in order 
to successfully communicate with others. But they do not suffice to provide memories 
with emotional and personal vividness or insightfulness. The empathic and emotional 
aspects of memory must foreground information in order for this to happen. The evoca-
tive power of a set of memories cannot be captured by accuracy conditions alone, even 
if they are introspective ones. 
How exactly should the epistemic role of introspection be distinguished from the value-
producing function of autobiographical memory? As mentioned previously, the unique 
personal value of memories is experienced as such, independently of the knowledge of 
oneself as the thinker of the contents of memories. This is an intricate issue, but here is 
the key idea. Influential accounts of introspection appeal to accuracy conditions and 
contents in order to justify introspective beliefs. According to one influential account, 
the contents are externally determined and introspecting them is simply a matter of be-
ing in a mental state with those contents—this is the so-called “transparency” view.19 A 
central feature of all accounts of introspection is that they aim at providing an expla-
nation of the authority of the first person in terms of epistemic justification. But such 
an epistemic attitude is not needed to experience memories as particularly valuable. In 
principle, there is no need for any external relation to accuracy conditions, inferential 
relations to contents, or judgments of what I personally experienced in order to be able 
to experience the moral or personal significance of a memory. These seem to be very 
different cognitive capacities, and the transactional view does justice to this difference. 
Attention, and Conscious Attention (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015).
17  Nina Strohminger, Joshua Knobe, and George Newman, “The True Self: A Psychological Concept 
Distinct from the Self,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 12, no. 4 (2017): 551–60. 
18  Susana Monsó, “Morality without Mindreading,” Mind and Language 32, no. 3 (2017): 338–57.
19  The classic account of transparency is Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference, edited by John McDowell 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1982). Alex Byrne (2005, 2011) provides an inferentialist account of 
introspective beliefs from mental contents; see Byrne, “Introspection,” Philosophical Topics 33, no. 1 (2005): 
79–104; and “Transparency, Belief, Intention,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society LXXXV (2011): 201–
21. For skepticism about knowledge of the self, based on contents, including the contents of memory, see 
Fred Dretske, “Awareness and Authority: Skeptical Doubts about Self-Knowledge,” in Introspection and 
Consciousness, edited by Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
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Another way of making this point is that the phenomenology of conscious memory is not 
merely determined by introspective judgments, even though introspective judgments 
certainly provide the epistemic basis for self-knowledge. We never experience memories 
as episodes one witnessed and to which one has unique access. This type of privileged 
access is involved in autobiographical memory, but much more is required to explain the 
personal value of memories. A property of conscious memory is to provide this type of 
value to memories as its proper function—to present us with vivid experiences that we 
care about, and that we immediately appreciate as valuable without needing to have an 
assertive or epistemic attitude toward them. We are confronted with such experientially 
rich memories as such, rather than as a relation between an epistemic attitude and a 
propositional content. We are not merely epistemically related to them through memory 
contents or through inferential introspections about beliefs concerning self-knowledge. 
If we were so dependent on introspective judgments, the phenomenology of conscious 
memory would not have the hold it has on us. 
But in what sense is the proper function of autobiographical memory to “provide” mem-
ories with a moral and aesthetic dimension? The following cases illustrate how accuracy 
and narrative significance need to be balanced, and how one cannot reduce one to the 
other. These cases illustrate the moral and aesthetic significance of memory, which seems 
to be a fundamental structural aspect of phenomenally conscious memory. Although they 
involve two conversations, and thus are not descriptions of memories per se, they illus-
trate the tension between accuracy and personal value.
Insult. Flo asks Nix: “Why did you say that about me yesterday? That was 
embarrassing.” Nix responds: “It was accurate information; the people involved 
were curious about that event in the past, so it was relevant for the conversational 
context. And in addition, I don’t find anything embarrassing in answering 
questions accurately and sincerely. Such information is important to plan for the 
future.” 
Enjoyment. Joy says to Nix: “I had so much fun last weekend. Remember what an 
amazing time we had at the amusement park?” Nix responds: “What I remember 
is that we arrived at 2.30. The day was not cloudy. There were big lines but we 
didn’t wait for long. We were together and had good food. We left after around 
four hours of being there and I remember you texted me on my way back home.” 
The first case is one of lack of empathic engagement with a shared memory. Strictly 
speaking, there is nothing epistemically wrong with Nix’s recollections. In fact, Nix is 
epistemically collaborative with the questioner; she is speaking with epistemic authority 
and her testimony can be relied upon. She might even be epistemically virtuous in an-
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swering the question truthfully. In fact, in some contexts, such as providing testimonial 
evidence before a court of law, Nix would certainly count as an epistemically responsible 
agent. The disagreement between Flo and Nix is not about accuracy. Rather, it is about 
the personal significance of this specific memory for Flo. Nix’s epistemically responsible 
assertions about this event in the past lead to the violation of a moral norm based on em-
pathic engagement, because a friend should not reveal personal information in public, in 
a way that is insulting to them. The phenomenology of the memory Flo has of this event 
is morally, rather than epistemically, relevant to her—what matters to her is how she feels 
about it, not whether her recollections accurately match Nix’s.
The second case has moral implications, but it is best described as a case in which there 
is a lack of engagement with the aesthetic aspects of memory. Joy remembers this eve-
ning as a particularly beautiful one. The pleasure she feels in remembering this evening 
cannot be reduced to the accurate descriptions provided by Nix. In fact, Nix’s accurate 
descriptions, which cannot be challenged by Joy, show that Nix attributes no personal 
significance to this memory. The situation is analogous to other cases in which there is 
a lack of aesthetic engagement or understanding on the part of the observer. If someone 
says “how beautiful the sky looks today” and someone else says in response “the sky has 
a purple and black and orange color, I can see very few stars, the moon is just starting 
to come out. I can see a few planes,” there is a sense in which this epistemically obsessed 
interlocutor has completely missed the point of the original statement.
In both cases, there is a clear sense in which providing accurate episodic memories in-
stead of empathically engaging with them reveals a lack of understanding of the other 
person as such. This is no accident. Episodic memory provides epistemic authority to in-
trospective beliefs that can be qualified with the statement “this happened to me.” This is 
the weakly autonoetic function of episodic memory. In order to understand the personal 
relevance of a memory (or set of memories), one needs the phenomenology of auto-
biographical memory. This engagement with vivid memories is the strongly autonoetic 
function of autobiographical memory. It is this strongly autonoetic function that helps 
us understand others personally and also understand ourselves as persons, rather than as 
repertoires of accurate episodic memories.
Are the above cases simply about emotional reactions to the contents of experience? 
This is one way of understanding autobiographical memory, as dependent on attitudes 
toward contents. According to the transactional view, this is the wrong way to analyze 
these cases. It is not true that Flo and Joy are simply evaluating how they feel about an 
accurate memory. Rather, it is how they remember those events that matters to them. 
They are not simply reacting emotionally through a series of introspective judgments 
concerning contents; how they remember those events is the source of their emotional 
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reactions. So the content account, according to the transactional view, gets things back-
wards. Autobiographical memory presents us with an already valuable content, indepen-
dently of judgments and explicit assessments. 
The nonepistemic trade-off that must be balanced between episodic and autobiographi-
cal memory is that the more one stays within an accurate linear, episodic description, the 
more one ignores the phenomenological vivacity and value of memories as one experi-
enced them. The more one departs from an accurate episodic description, the higher the 
risks of confabulation. 
4. The Transactional View
Although there is no extant defense of the transactional view, at least not in the way pre-
sented here, based on trade-offs and the distinction between phenomenally conscious 
memory and what one can call, invoking Ned Block’s distinction, “access memory,”20 
there are important precedents.21 None of these authors, however, defends a transaction-
al view that aims at reconciling reliability with narrative plausibility in terms of trade-
offs. An advantage of the transactional view is that it allows for dramatic transitions 
between personalities within a single episodic timeline independently of accuracy. Two 
equally accurate episodic memories may lead to intense regret or intense satisfaction, 
depending on the overall autobiographical narrative. This explains why remembering 
the same event with a new phenomenological and empathic filter can transform our-
selves, surprise us, and even change us in profound ways.22 
As explained in the introduction, Goodman distinguishes between an exposition or re-
port and a story. One may keep a meticulous daily record of events without consider-
ing this document a personal journal. The record may be accurate in chronology and 
provide evidence of our past activities, and to that extent be autonoetic. But it may not 
20  Ned Block, “On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18, no. 
2 (1995): 227–47; “On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness,” in The Nature of Consciousness: 
Philosophical Debates, edited by Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, and Güven Güzeldere (Cambridge MA: MIT 
Press), 375–415.
21  Two prominent examples in the recent literature are Martin A. Conway and Christopher Pleydell-Pearce, 
“The Construction of Autobiographical Memories in the Self-Memory System, Psychological Review 107, no. 
2 (2000): 261–88; and Mark Rowlands, Memory and the Self: Phenomenology, Science and Autobiography 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). As mentioned, another precedent is Goodman, “Twisted 
Tales.” There are interesting analogies between the transactional view and some views about collective 
memory, but I shall not develop this topic in this paper.
22  The work of Laurie Paul on transformative experiences is very relevant here; see Paul, Transformative 
Experience (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
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have any personal significance. In fact, it is surprising to see how something one wrote 
about an event that in the past was extremely relevant to our self-esteem has completely 
lost personal significance, in spite of its accuracy and coherence with other events at the 
time. Goodman’s point concerns personal meaning, not reportlike or logical coherence. 
In a confession, for instance, report-coherence and mere epistemic accuracy are signs 
of dishonesty. The trade-off here is between a report and a valuable and meaningful 
narrative of our past. 
The balance of the epistemic trade-offs must guarantee that memory is reliable enough 
for the purposes of communication and testimony. The balance of the narrative trade-
off is that memories should be insightful enough for me to value them as something that 
really matters to me. These are the external and internal justificatory roles of episodic 
and autobiographical memory. Making sense of our past in an insightful and morally 
relevant way differs from communicatively asserting the authority of beliefs about the 
past from the perspective of “what happened to me.” The trade-off, restated, is that the 
more one stays within an episodic structure, the more difficult it is to account for the 
personal value of memories, and the more one departs from an episodic structure, the 
higher the risks of confabulation. 
The balance between the epistemic and moral needs of an individual is a transaction 
between accuracy and internal value, as illustrated by the distinction between a report 
and a story. Autobiographical (phenomenally conscious) memory plays a morally valu-
able role. Other forms of memory that give us access to accurate information, chiefly 
episodic memory, play an epistemic role. Both types of memory interact constantly and 
they may seem indistinguishable to some. But if the transactional view is correct, the 
point can be clearly stated in terms of two types of justification—an epistemically nor-
mative one and a morally (and perhaps even aesthetically) normative one. The internal 
and external justificatory roles of memory can be articulated in terms of “anti-luck” 
conditions:
Veridicality. Episodic memory capacities provide weakly autonoetic memories 
that are not luckily accurate, thereby providing an external kind of justification 
for beliefs about memories. This kind of memory may be implicit or explicit 
(unconscious or “access” conscious).
Narrative integrity. The moral and aesthetic value of autobiographical memory 
provides an internal kind of justification, such that my narrative is not 
artificially or luckily related to what I value as an individual (this is, essentially, 
a phenomenally conscious kind of memory, which is strongly autonoetic).
Memory informs vast regions of our epistemic lives. We use episodic memory, in par-
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ticular, to ground forms of epistemic vigilance regarding the reliability of information 
concerning past events, epistemic authority with respect to assertions based on beliefs 
justified by episodic memory, and social epistemic exchanges that depend on testimony 
and shared memories. Reliable communication, counterfactual reasoning, and deci-
sion-making depend on these critical epistemic skills.
Memory, however, also enriches our lives by making them engaging, vividly relevant, 
and meaningful. The phenomenology of autobiographical memory deserves more at-
tention in memory studies, because the moral and aesthetic experiences afforded by 
these memories are not analyzable in strictly epistemic terms. What makes autobio-
graphical memory engaging is the strongly autonoetic insights we gain through partic-
ularly valuable memories. Here memory transcends epistemic vigilance and authority. 
Memory becomes a source of moral and aesthetic engagement with the world and with 
the emotions and sensations of others.
Much more work needs to be done in this area of philosophical and psychological in-
quiry. The transactional view provides a fresh perspective on the complexities of why 
episodic memory may not be our only way to know about the world and ourselves 
through memory. There is also the vital contribution of autobiographical memory to 
our mental lives—the enormous importance we give to certain memories that are a 
fundamental part of who we are. 
Conclusion
Our basic intuitions tell us that memory plays a fundamentally epistemic role. What 
would be the value of memory if it gave us confabulation rather than accurate access to 
the past? Even if some memories are pleasant or morally valuable, what real value could 
they possible have if they are false? Whatever value memory has as a mental capacity, it 
must fully depend on its epistemic value. Whatever knowledge we gain about ourselves 
through memory must also depend on or be reducible to epistemic notions and criteria. 
This form of value monism, applied to memory, is very plausible. This is the prevailing, 
monistic view, of memory.
The uneasy relation between report and narrative described by Goodman complicates 
this picture. It certainly is true that remembering a confabulated life, even an interest-
ing and vivid one, is a particularly sad kind of delusion. But this does not mean that the 
sole purpose of memory is necessarily epistemic. In particular, our autobiographical 
memories need to be meaningful to us, and not just be accurate. But the relation be-
tween personal value and accuracy is not straightforward. The value of autobiographi-
cal memory is unique because it cannot be reduced to the reportlike deliverances of epi-
sodic memory. Thus, some balance is needed between epistemic and autobiographical 
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value. Besides this tension between accuracy and personal value, the scientific evidence 
shows that our memory capacities systematically relax and even ignore epistemic stan-
dards for accuracy when confronted with contextually important, personally signifi-
cant, or narratively plausible information.
Memory, according to the transactional view, plays two different roles that give rise to two 
distinctive values and justification bases. The episodic memory system satisfies epistemic 
needs, and is valuable because it is a source of justification for beliefs about the past. This 
is the system we use in order to perform tasks concerning epistemic vigilance, epistemic 
authority with respect to events in the past, counterfactual reasoning, and planning. Au-
tobiographical memory, by contrast, satisfies moral and strongly autonoetic needs, and 
is valuable because it is a source of meaningful and insightful experiences about our past. 
Unlike autobiographical memory, episodic memory is only weakly autonoetic.
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